understood only when considered in its historical setting; (2) that this consideration leads to the belief that the in conshnili casit clause was intended not to increase the writ-issuing power of the Chancery, but to provide machinery for the reference to Parliament of disputed petitions for writs, as a last recourse beyond the Chancery itself; (3) that the writs resulting from the in consintili casit clause are few and definite, the writ of entry in consimili casu, the writ of ravishment of ward for socage tenure, and possibly a few others mentioned in the Register of WVrits; (4) that each writ unquestionably derived from chapter 24 concerns real property, while case applied to real property only late in its development; (5) that the Year Books mention no connection between the Statute and case; and (6) that the first suggestion of a connection between the two was made by William Lambard in the Archeion," whence Blackstone borrowed the idea and popularized it. Plucknett's conclusion is that historically the action on the case could not have come from the Statute of \Vestminster II, that no one believed hi the origin of the action in the Statute until at least the beginning of the seventeenth century, and that the theory was not generally credited until the end of the eighteenth century, when Blackstone's sponsorship provided the prestige on which the belief has lived ever since.
- 12 Plucknett's attack on the generally accepted theory of the origin of case is entirely destructive; his sole aim is to show that the action probably did not come from the statute. 3 The Traditionalists, on the other hand, emphasize their conception of the way in which case originated -a positive theory of the course of events-with such vigor that they overlook or minimize the contradictory information brought out by Plucknett. There are certain difficulties that preclude unqualified acceptance of the Plucknett view,' 4 especially because it offers no substitute for the Traditionalist theory; and conversely, the Traditionalist theory 11. Lambard wrote the ARCHESON about 1591, but it was not published until 1635. For the statement on case and the Statute of Westminster II see LAMBARD, ARcHFroN (1635) 61-62.
12. Plucknett could have made his point even more strongly by indicating that it was Blackstone who first mentioned the in consimili casu clause in connection with the action on the case. 3 BL. Commss. *52. Lambard quoted a few lines of the Statute, from the first and possibly the twenty-fourth chapters [LAMBARD, ARCHEION (1635) 61], but he did not cite the in consinili casu clause. It was Blackstone who first introduced that bit of the Traditionalist theory some five hundred years after the appearance of the action.
13. Remarks suggestive of the origins of the action on the case are found in his CONcISE HISTORY OF THE CoiiON LAW (2d ed. 1936) 335, 414-16. 14. Plucknett's treatment of the meaning and significance of the Provisions of Oxford [1259, 43 HEN. III; STUBBS, SELEc'r CHARTERS (9th ed. 1913) 378] is not universally acceptable; and his assumption that all modem writers believe that the name of the action on the case came from the in consimili casu clause is probably an overstatement.
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is weakened considerably by its failure to account for some of the facts stressed by Plucknett.Y;
The situation at the present time is, therefore, that each of the parties to this controversy stoutly maintains his own position, the question is not settled, and most of those who might be interested in a resolution of the dispute continue to think and teach that case came from the in conshiili casu clause. The purpose of the present paper is constructive rather than controversial. The subject is so obscure that it may never be possible to establish the origins of the action of trespass on the case by an offer of historically incontrovertible evidence. But the evidence that now exists indicates first that the action of case did not come from the Statute of Westminster II, and second that the action was a gradual and evolutionary common law development, in the late fourteenth and the fifteenth centuries, out of the older action of trespass Ti et armis.
I. ACTION ON THE CASE AND THE STATUTE OF WESTMINSTER II
That the action of trespass on the case did not develop from the Statute of Westminster II is indicated by a study of the Statute in the light of the condition of the judiciary in the thirteenth century." 0 It has been commonly supposed that the Statute set up a machinery for the issue of new writs by the Chancery, and that the best known product of that machinery was the writ of trespass on the case. If it is true that the Statute did establish maclhinery by which the writ of trespass on the case was formulated, then it would not be too much to say that the action came from the Statute, even though it appeared long after the Statute had been enacted. The connection between the action and the Statute is much less clear, however, if the machinery set up by the Statute was not for the issuance of new writs, or if there is no indi-
15.
Landon has yet to prove that the popularization of the Traditionalist theory of the origin of case was not the work of Blackstone, who took it from Lambard. And the Traditionalist view that the action on the case existed in the thirteenth century, before 1285, lacks conviction because of their apparent ignorance of recent wor: on the development of the action of trespass in the thirteenth century. See Woudbine. The Origins of the Action of Trespass (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 799, (1925) 34 YAxZ L. J. 343. 16. Plucknett has made a rather exhaustive study of the Statute itself in its historical background [Plucknett, loc. cit. supra note 3, 31 Co,-L Rev.], but it seems advisable to reconsider the matter. Landon's article [Landon, loc. cit. supra note 51. which has appeared since Plucknett's. has raised some new questions (notably that of the brevia inagistralia) which Plucknett did not discuss. And I do not entirely agree with some of Plucknett's conclusions concerning the thirteenth century lacl:.round. especially concerning the effect of the Provisiuns of Oxford [Plucknett, supra nute 3. 31 CoL. L. RE%. at 793-94]. But Plucknett's statement that "the actian of cave is unrelated to the statute," is still acceptable. Plucknett, sispra note 3. 31 C,,. L REv. at 783.
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cation that the writ of case was in fact developed in accordance with that machinery. The problem is reduced, therefore, to deciding whether the statute created a chancery procedure for issuing new writs or for issuing writs like Bracton's brezvia magistralia of the early thirteenth century, 17 and to deciding whether there is any evidence that the writ of case was the result of the chancery procedure established.
A determination of the effect of chapter 24 of the Statute of 1285 on the issuing of writs by the Chancery depends in part upon the stated purpose of the chapter: "In cases in which a writ is granted in the Chancery because of the act of someone, from henceforth the plaintiffs shall not leave the King's court without a remedy because the tenement has been transferred from one to another. . . . "s The chapter proceeds to give three examples of the extended remedies: the assize of nuisance, which thereafter could be brought against the alienee as well as against the levyor and alienor of a tenement upon which a nuisance had been levied ;1" the quod perinittat, which thereafter could be used by a parson against the disseisor or his heir to recover common of pasture lost by his predecessor, just as before the Statute the parson's predecessor could have recovered by a writ of novel disseisin;° and the assize ittrmn, which was extended to try the question of right between two churches where the tenement in dispute had been alienated from one church to another.
2 ' Apparently chapter 24 gave three specific examples of forms of writs which henceforth were to be issued by the Chancery under circumstances slightly variant from those in which they had previously been issued. This was in accordance with the principle stated in 17 [Vol. 46: 1142 the chapter that he who would hitherto have been deprived of a remedy because of the transference of the tenement should henceforth have a remedy despite that alienation. None of the remedies given was new; each was a well known form of writ, with a change only in the parties to the suit.
A similar but more general provision for the extension of familiar remedies to slightly varying cases .is found in the last paragraph of the twenty-fourth chapter, containing the in consimili casu clause:
"And whenever henceforth, it shall happen in the Chancery that in one case a writ is found and in a like case falling under the same law and requiring a like remedy [no writ is found], then the clerks of the Chancery shall agree in making the writ, or they may adjourn the plaintiffs until the next parliament, and let them write the cases in which they cannot agree and refer them to the next parliament, and let the writ be made with the consent of the wise men of the law; and from henceforth, let it not happen that the court any longer fail complainants seeking justice."2
The actual meaning of this paragraph can be determined only by a consideration of the rest of the Statute. The purpose of the Statute of Westminster II was to fill the gaps in the common law by creating legal remedies for certain cases then unprovided for by common or statute law. This purpose was carried out by three types of provisions: first, by the provisions for the better enforcement of previously created statutory remedies, such as the writ of cessavit given by the Statute of Gloucester;24 second, by the provision for entirely new remedies, such as the famous writ of fornedon and third, by the provision for the formulation of similar writs for similar cases both at that time and in the future. This third objective was achieved in the twenty-fourth chapter, through the forms of writs there rehearsed and through the definition in the last paragraph of the way in which these similar forms of writs could be obtained. 
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This attempt in 1285 to supply the deficiencies in the common law would hardly have been necessary fifty years earlier. During the first half of the thirteenth century the common law of England was expanding rapidly in all directions, 2 " not through statutory enactment, but through the cooperation of the King's courts and the Chancery in trying to grant a remedy for almost every wrong presented for their consideration. 2 T There were. perhaps, some political reasons for this expansion of the law. The King's courts were trying to draw to themselves the major portion of the judicial business of the realm in order to supplant the local and feudal courts. 28 To effect this end they were willing to give a remedy to almost any complainant who appeared before them.
20
The Chancery, also eager to enhance the power of the King and the central government which it represented, aided and abetted the courts by establishing writs that enabled complainants to get their cases into the courts."o A second reason for the flexibility of the forms of action in the early thirteenth century lies in the principle of damages, so important in English law. which had just been introduced through the medium of the assize of novel disseisin and was gradually spreading to the other forms of action." 1 Until after 1250 these actions for damages took no one fixed form, but were brought usually by a complaint in the form of a quare writ out of the Chancery. 3 2 The range and variation as well 26 . This growth becomes evident in comparing the highly developed law of BaAcTo.N-s DE LEGIBcS with the writs in Glanvill's work and in the early IRIsH By the latter part of the thirteenth century, the nature of the common law had been changed by the emergence of the formalized action of trespass from these hybrid quare actions and by the establishment of the King's courts as the controlling judiciary of the kingdom. Secure in their position, the central courts turned their attention to systematizing and formalizing the lav they applied."' The Chancery, pervaded by the same spirit and repressed by the Provisions of Oxford 3 5 a result designed to suit the situation at hand; and during the time of Bracton, before 1259, these variant writs could be issued without the specific assent of the "common council."
BRACToN, DE Laimus f. 414b. of the temporarily successful opposition of the Barons to the growing centralized power of the King -ceased granting writs not already established in their registers in a set form. Out of the quare actions, as formless actions for damages in general, emerged the specialized writ of trespass; but the writ of trespass granted redress for injury done 1y direct force, and did not apply to other types of injuries. Thus a spirit of conservatism settled upon the courts and upon the Chancery, producing an ossification of the system of writs, which was to change little except by statute for several hundred years.
33.
That this ossification had set in by the year 1285 is indicated by the quocicuscunque clause in which Edward urges the use of new and variant remedies." The Statute of Westminster II would have been an anomaly in the "golden age of the forms of action," as Pollock and Maitland had called the earlier thirteenth century.3 But by 1285 this Statute was needed to counteract the formalism and conservatism of the Chancery and of the courts. The provisions of chapter 24 and of the rest of the Statute were attempts by Edward to provide remedies for otherwise remediless plaintiffs. And the in consimnili casu clause was intended to authorize a petition to Parliament for variant forms of writs should the chancery clerks and the "wise men" of the realm fail to grant the necessary writs."' These writs, however, were to be secured only for a "like case falling under the same law and requiring a like remedy" to a writ already in existence." It would be safe to assume, did the Year Books not prove the point conclusively, that the reactionaries in the Chancery and in the courts would place a very strict interpretation upon the degree of "similarity" required in such situations.
It 41 were actually framed under the provisions of the in consimnli casu clause, the writ of entry in consintili casu 4 2 and the writ of ravishment of ward for socage tenure. 43 The former writ, an extension of the writ of entry in casu proviso given by the Statute of Gloucester," was 43. RErISTRUM BREVIUM (1687) f. 161b, 162. 44. 1278, 6 EDw. I, c. 7. Prior to the Statute of Gloucester there had existed a writ of entry ad communcm legen, which allowed the reversioner to recover after the death of a tenant for life, in dower, or by the curtesy, when the tenant had conveyed. The limitation of actions during the tenant's lifetime was something of a hardship, however, because if the tenant for life died long after the alienation, recovery by the reversioner would be more difficult. In the Statute of Gloucester, c. 7 provided that the reversioner after a tenant in dower might recover during the life of the doweress (where she alienated in fee, in tail, or for life) by a writ of entry in casts proviso, a writ which always recited the Statute. Until 1310 the reversioner still could not recover during the life of a tenant for life or by the curtesy, if the tenant conveyed; in that year there appeared the writ of entry it consimili casu--or, as the Year Book says, recover immediately upon an alienation in fee by a tenant by the curtesy, the writ was also abated and again Bereford, C. J., was called in for The writ of entry in consimili casu thereafter became a regular writ of course, fixed in form. 40 It appears from these statements that the writ was a direct derivative of the Statute of Westminster II, chapter 24; but only after strenuous argument was the court willing to consider the various forms of a life estate sufficiently similar to come within the meaning of the Statute. 
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Although it is equally clear that the writ of ravishment of ward in socage tenure was formed upon the basis of the in consimili casui clause, it had a somewhat different history. One Agnes Frowyk, early in the reign of Edward II, was procheyne arnie to an infant tenant by socage who had been "ravished" and married against the will of both tenant and next friend. Agnes petitioned Parliament for redress, knowing that there was no remedy at law for the injury," 0 and was told to seek a writ in Chancery formed according to her case. The Chancery accordingly made the slight variation necessary in the established writ of ravishment of ward for knight's service tenure, 5 and Agnes' case came before the court. The defendants there objected to the form of the writ, but the objections were not sustained by the court. Aside from these two writs, however, there seem to have been no other writs developed specifically upon the basis of the in consinili casu clause, although the Statute was more than once quoted in support of an unusual writ."a In the case of Tauney v. St. Onters," 0 an action on a writ of right, the plaintiff contended that the provisions in the Statute of Gloucester that the heir should not be barred from his mother's inheritance by his father's deed had been extended by the in consintili casn clause so that an heir would not be barred from his father's inheritance by his mothers fine. The court rejected this argument and non-suited the plaintiff because lie was not within the Statute of Gloucester without making any specific remarks concerning the in consimnili casu clause. Three years later the court stated its position concisely. In St. Michacl v. Bcauchamp, an action upon a writ of entry in casu proviso, the plaintiff was a remainderman trying to recover immediately after alienation by a tenant in tail. His counsel counted upon the in consim ili casu clause as well as upon the Statute of Gloucester rehearsed in the writ, but the court said: "HoWARD, J. The Statute of Gloucester only says where the reversion, etc., and the Statute of Westminster II directs that in a similar case there shall be a similar remedy; but these two things. reversions and remainders, are not similar. ' ' I s These cases are strongly suggestive of a conservative attitude on the part of the Chancery and of the courts in their interpretation of the in consinuili casu clause of chapter 24 of the Statute. The clause could not be relied upon to support an unusual form of a writ unless the plaintiff could show a striking similarity between the case for which the variant form was needed and the one in which the writ of course was usually granted. If the likeness had to be as close as that between the three kinds of tenure for life, if it had to be more apparent than that between remainders and reversions, what reason is there to think that the similarity between an injury done with force and an injury done without force could have been regarded as sufficiently close?
In the early actions of "special" trespass out of which case developed, 9 not only is there no attempt to show a similarity between the facts in the case for which special trespass is brought and those for which an action of "general" trespass would lie, but the emphasis is invariably upon the dissimilarity. Unlike the plaintiffs in the early cases of entry in consimili casu and ravishment of ward in socage tenure, the plaintiff 
62.
Two other cases of the period reflect the same attitude of the court. In 1363, a writ of trespass str le cas was brought against a miller for taking two bushels of grain as multure from the plaintiff, who claimed that he and his ancestors had ground without toll from time out of mind. The court refused to sustain the writ, saying, in the words of Wichingham, J.: "Supposing that he had taken all your grain or half of it, shall you have such a writ because he had taken more than he ought to take for multure? No, you shall not, but a common writ of trespass; and so you shall have here. Wherefore you take nothing by your writ." Y. B. MAfich. 41 Edw. III, f. 24, pl. 17 (1367). Although the court did not state the permissible uses of the writ of trespass sur le cas brought against the miller, they did say that it would not lie for a taking of grain as multure, for which the common writ of trespass lay. In 1368 the court was thus unwilling to admit that the writ of trespass sur le cas was in that respect a substitute for the writ of trespass; for in whatever situation the writ of trespass could serve, trespass stir le cas would not lie. In an action of trespass "on all the matter according to the case," against a common innkeeper for lack of care in protecting the plaintiff's goods [Y. B. Pasch. 42 Edw. III, f. 11, pl. 13 (1369)], it is clear that the writ was brought because of negligence, for which general trespass did not lie; it w%-as, therefore, necessary to have the writ "upon all the matter according to the case." General trespass vould have served against the innkeeper only had he himself taken the plaintiff's goods.
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The court's view of the divergence between general trespass and the '"special" writ of trespass is seen elsewhere in the Waldon case. The court said that in a writ of trespass the phrases contra pacenl and ita negligentcr were mutually exclusive. 3 This opinion is significant of a distinction between forceful injury (contra pacem) and injury from negligence (ita negligenter) so clear cut that it is unlikely that either the Chancery or the court could ever have regarded the injuries as sufficiently similar, within the meaning of chapter 24 of Westminster II, to extend to the latter the remedy for the former.
In the suit brought by Justice Rikhiill and others for the disturbance of their easement by the ploughing of the land of two parsons of Bromaye, Skrene. counsel for the plaintiffs, said: "This writ is not contra paccn, but is a writ upon our case; and if they had disturbed me with sword or staff or other weapon, I should have nmade a good declaration against them contra paccin, and I should be well able to maintain it upon my matter."
Skrene was saving that if the disturbance had been with force and arms, lie would have brought a general writ of trespass; but the plaintiffs' way across the defendants' land had been disturbed only because the defendants' land was ploughed tip. and the general writ would not lie. The distinction was between a peaceful disturbance of the plaintiffs' rights and a disturbance which was against the peace, two wrongs which were surely not within the degree of the similarity required by the King's courts for the application of the in consiinili casit clause.
The fact that dissimilarity rather than similarity in the actual facts of the case was responsible for the use of the "special" writ of trespass was brought out again in Brownhe v. Hawkins." 5 Townesende, counsel for the defendant, said that one should not combine vi et armis and a recital of special matter in the same writ; the former, a direct injury, was a matter to be remedied by "general" trespass; the latter, a question of negligence. could be remedied only by an action upon the case.
The dissimilarity between the facts leading to a "special" action of trespass and those on which the "general" action could be based is not 63. "Kirton [for the defendant]. Challenge of the writ, in that the writ makes mention contra pacem and in his count he has counted of his cure ita negligenter that the horse died, so that that cannot be said to be against the peace. And the justices were of the opinion that the writ was bad; and then the writ was read and was found not to contain the words contra paccn, wherefore the writ was awarded good. [Vol. 46: 1142 only apparent to a modern Year Book reader; but in the Year Book period it was emphasized by counsel and the courts themselves. This would seem to eliminate the possibility that the "special" writ of trespass was formed under the authorization of the clause of the Statute of Westminster II providing that in like cases like remedies were to be granted. From the beginning the necessary difference in the operative factual elements of "special" and "general" trespass would have prevented the application of the in consinili casu clause.
Further doubt is thrown upon the Traditionalist view by an examination of the date at which case began to appear as an established action. A development of the action on the case shortly after the enactment of the Statute of Westminster II would at least make more plausible the theory that the action grew from the Statute than would a development of the action many years later. The opinions of secondary authorities upon the date of the origin of the action reveal a wide discrepancy. Some writers of reputation ascribe the action to the end of the fourteenth century, a hundred years after the statute; others believe it developed at the beginning of that century. 0 What accounts for this variation of opinion, and which opinion is the more tenable?
Almost without exception modern writers on the origin of the action on the case have taken their examples of the early actions on the case from one or more of these three sources: FitzHerbert's Abridgment, Brooke's Abridgment, or the indices of the Vulgate Year Books. 0 Upon the sixteenth and seventeenth century writers represented in these three works, therefore, may be laid some of the responsibility for the varied and often erroneous conceptions of the date of the origin of case. They were probably led astray by a tendency to classify as case all actions in the Year Books of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in which case would have been permissible in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. That the action of case expanded its scope steadily, and covered many 66 THE 3:4LE LAI" JOURNAL more wrongs in the latter period than in the earlier, has never been denied; it is certainly substantiated by the Year Book reports themselves. Yet modern scholars have been deceived by early writers who classified as case actions which were not called case at the time they were tried.
FitzHerbert's Abridgment and Brooke's Abridgment formed the principle "primary" source used by lawyers and legal historians until comparatively recent times. FitzHerbert includes some eighteen examples from the fourteenth century reports under the heading Accion stir le Case." The earliest of these were two cases of the reign of Edward II; one, supposedly from the year 1318, seems to have been an action on a writ of right, and the other, cited as 1323, was an action of trespass. 9 Included also is an action of trespass from 14 Edward III.70 The other fourteenth century actions classified as case came later in the century, 1367 or after. Although all these were placed under the heading Accion sur le Case, FitzHerbert said in fact that only seven were examples of actions on the case and eleven were examples of some other form of action. We shall probably never know why he put the latter in the group. Some of the cases were illustrative of actions which case had partially replaced by the sixteenth century; some involved a point of law later important in the development of case; but others had little possible relation to case. Of the eleven citations of actions which were not case, seven were ordinary actions of trespass ;7 and four were complaints by bill. usually a bill of trespass -but, at any rate, never a bill of trespass on the case. 72 FitzHerbert was not even accurate in the seven actions which he called case: Six seem to be citations of actions which were in the transitional process between trespass and trespass on the case; one was a dictum referring to a special judicial writ of trespass, not involving an action of trespass on the case at all. 73 Brooke's Abridgment lists twenty-six items 74 from the fourteenth century under Accion stir le Case; eighteen of these he said were case. actually case, many of their readers overlooked the fact. That a specific case was reported in one or both of the Abridgments in the chapter on action on the case seemed to later lawyers and scholars to be adequate proof that it was really an example of case, whether or not the Abridgment report or the Year Book report itself warranted the assumption. The later writers were also led astray by the fact that the distinction between a casual dictum and a holding never troubled the sixteenth century lawyer. The editors of the Vulgate edition of the Year Books share with the compilers of the Abridgments in the responsibility for misleading later readers on the date of the appearance of the action on the case. In marginal notes and in their index classification they labeled reports Accion sur le Case whenever they thought that case would have lain in their own day, the latter seventeenth century. The dependence of modern writers upon these three sources for a determination of the date of the origin of case makes the discrepancies in their results understandable. The date accepted depended upon the credulity of the writer. 
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writers and of the cases upon which the opinions rest has yielded interesting results. Of all the cases mentioned or referred to in connection with action on the case, 8 3 in no case earlier than the last decade of Edward III, 1367, did the reporter or the participants call it action on the case or trespass on the case at the time it was tried," 4 and not one from its context seems to bear any definite relationship to the action on the case. What, then, were the cases earlier than 1367 which are considered by one person or another to have been case? Some of them were ordinary actions of trespass;"' some were actions for conspiracy;80 others were actions for deceit ;87 and several were bills of some form or other., These have most frequently been confused with case. There were a few other miscellaneous actions: debt, 0 waste," and some that are hard to identify because of the fragmentary nature of the report; one was probably an action of scandahtn magnattm, 0 ' one seems to have been a writ of ravishment of ward 02 one was possibly an action of replevin, 3 and one was a presentment. THE ORIGINS OF TRESPASS ON THE CASE merit classification as an action on the case:"0 The first is that the plea roll record indicates that the case did not turn on the failure to carry out the agreement to transport the horse safely, but upon the defendant's delict in overloading the boat; issue was joined on the defectunt, with no hint of negligence or failure to perform an agreement, as would have been the issue in an action on the case."' Secondly, the plaintiff's action was neither covenant nor trespass, and therefore was not trespass on the case; for the latter action was considered an integral part of trespass until many generations later. 0 This is indicated by the statement of Richmond, counsel for the defendant, that "his action should be by way of covenant or by way of trespass." Thirdly, as both the Year Book report and the plea roll record prove, this was an action begun by bill rather than an ordinary common law action begun by an original writ out of the Chancery.
0 That a wrong was remediable by a bill is no proof that it was remediable by a writ of the same nature; and in this case there was no mention of this as a bill of trespass on the case. Complaint by bill was not an uncommon method of commencing an action in the middle of the fourteenth century, 10 0 but it was a method distinct from that of suing an original writ out of Chancery. 97. Id. at 37. 98. The term trespass was applied, both to the general action of trespass vi et arinis and to the "special" action of trespass, until a date much later than the fourteenth century, so that trespass here would include both the general and the special forms of the action-See Bretherton v. Wood, 3 Br. & B. 54, 59 (1821), where counsel says that "the reporter has written trespass, meaning probably trespass on the case." 99. Procedure by bill was an alternate method to procedure by writ in the common law courts. A bill was generally a presentation of the complaint. drawn up by the party himself, rather than a writ issued by the Chancery, and might he in a language othcr than Latin 100. An examination of the plea roll of the King's Bench on which the Humber case was found [P. R. 0., K. B.27/354] shows that out of a thousand or so cases on that roll there are about thirty complaints by bill. The bills were all complaints of trespass, mostly of assault, and were all from Berkshire. in which county the King's Bench was sitting for the term in question, Michaelmas, 22 Edward III. Hastings, supra note q6. at 35, 37.
being trespass on the case. The only basis for connecting this case with the latter action was the marginal notation in the printed Year Book (made several centuries later).
The Humber case, then, is no exception to the general statement that, as far as we now know, there were no actions like trespass on the case earlier than the last years of the reign of Edward III. Thus for at least eighty years after the enactment of the Statute of Westminster II the in consimili casu clause had not been used to formulate a writ similar to that of trespass on the case.
Nor is there any indication, when actions of case or transition actions similar to case did begin to appear, that the action was considered at that time to be derived from the Statute. Plucknett has made the point that in the Year Book reports of actions upon the case no mention was ever made of a connection between the action and the Statute."' 0 Both Landon and Holdsworth have tried to argue this away by saying that the omission of any reference to the Statute has no evidential weight because the statutory provision was so well known that a reference would have been unnecessary. Perhaps they have all overlooked the fact that case was sometimes specifically labeled a common law action.
In an anonymous case of 1505, an action on the case for diverting water from the stream which fed the plaintiff's mill, Pigot, counsel for the defendant, demanded judgment of the writ because the plaintiff could have brought an assize of nuisance. 3 " . for one shall never have an action on the case where he can have other action at the common law." This statement in argument implies that an action on the case was an action "at the common law," and was not connected with any statute.
A more definite statement is found in the judgment of the court in an anonymous case of 1409."04 This was a suit brought against a carpenter for the non-performance of a parole promise to build a house; the action has all the earmarks of "special" trespass though it was not specifically called that, and was similar to the action later called trespass on the case.
"HILL, J. Because it seems to the court that this action which is taken at common law is based on a thing which is covenant in itself, of which nothing is shown, the court awards that you take nothing by your writ, etc."
The wide range of subjects covered by the action of case in its fully developed form casts further doubt upon the theory of its derivation from the Statute of Westminster II. Within the boundaries set for it as a remedy for indirect injuries, case expanded in many directions. A number of wrongs for which it early served as a remedy have been noted incidentally: negligent treatment of a horse by a farrier or by a horse doctor; negligent treatment of an injured man by a surgeon; an innkeeper's failure to protect his guest's goods; disturbance of a right of way. From cases for misfeasance and later for nonfeasance in the performance of an agreement, came a large part of the law of simple contract. At a later time, case lay also for waste. And in tile role of an action for trover and conversion, a substitute for detinue and for the old criminal actions for theft, trespass on the case produced the law of personal property.
It would be unique to find so large a list of subjects in a statutory action, even in an action evolved by the Chancery under the provisions of chapter 24 of the Statute of Westminster II. Statutory actions and actions such as the writ of ravishment of ward in socage, though developed from a statutory provision, were limited in scope to the specific situation for which the statute provided a remedy.
10 3 This same principle generally limited the extension of any new writ formulated by the Chancery. There are many writs in the Register which are said to have been invented by this Chancellor or that clerk, yet most of these writs applied only to one particular circumstance. It seems doubly doubtful, therefore, that the writ of special trespass, or trespass on the case, which not only applied to various situations when it first appeared in the Year Books, but continued to expand without further statutory enlargement, could have come, either directly or indirectly, from the Statute of Vestminster II.
To summarize: the Year Book cases furnish strong proof in themselves that the early forms of the action on the case were not derived from the Statute of Westminster II. The fact that counsel and courts stressed the dissimilarity between case and trespass rather than the similarity required under the in consinili casu clause, the fact that the action was regarded as at common law rather than under a statute, the fact that the action on the case covered a wide range of subjects, and finally the fact that the action was not developed until long after the Statute, these items of internal evidence added to the already formidable array of external proof practically destroy the traditional theory that the action of trespass on the case was derived from the in consinili casu clause of chapter 24 of the Statute of Westminster IL
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRESPASS ON THE CASE
That the action of trespass on the case was the result of a common law development independent of the Statute of Westminster 11 is shown 105. See pp. 1151-54, msipra.
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in the Year Book reports. By a process of evolution and growth the action of case as "special" trespass branched away from the older action of trespass vi ct arm is. Thus the action of trespass on the case began its career not as a new and distinct form of action but as a special type of the well known action of trespass -a means developed by the courts to provide a remedy for injuries caused without direct force which were outside of the scope of trespass vi et armis.
In the first case found among the printed judicial records of the fourteenth century in which the phrase trespass sur le cas occurs, a distinction appears to have been made between "common" trespass and the writ in the case. This early action of trespass sur le cas was brought in 1367 against a miller for taking multure when the plaintiff claimed the right to have his grain ground toll-free. 1 ' The report indicates a distinction made by both counsel and court between a special writ of trespass sur le cas or sur ma niattcr, and a "general writ with force and arms" or a .,common writ of trespass." The use of the words "general" and "conmon" writ of trespass. in contrast to the form of the writ of trespass called by the reporter sur le cas, implies that the latter was a special form of the more usual writ of trespass.' 7 A similar distinction occurs in the case of Waldon v. Marshall. William de \Valdon brought a "special writ according to the case" against John Marshall for negligently killing the plaintiff's horse while seeking to doctor it.' 0 s Perhaps because the circumstances of the case differed from those in which trespass vi et arm is would lie, 1 09 the plaintiff brought "special writ according to the case." When counsel for the defendant said that the plaintiff might "have a general writ of trespass, that he 106. Y. B. Mich. 41 Edw. III, f. 24, pl. 17 (1367). The form of the writ is given by the reporter: "That when the said John, etc., and his ancestors from time of which memorv does not run, were accustomed to grind their grain without multure, etc., the said defendant, etc., with force and arms [-z et armis] interrupted the said complainant from milling without multure" by taking two bushels of grain. The report continues: "Candish [for the defendant] . . .a general writ that he took his grain with force and arms lies, and not this writ; judgment of the writ. Belknap [for the plaintiff]. The writ is taken upon my matter [sur ma matter] and if he has taken toll where he ought not to have taken it, I shall have a writ against him. Thorpe. You shall have a quod permittat against the tenant of the soil, and there it shall be tried, and not in a writ against the defendant. . . . WICHINGHAI, J. Supposing that he had taken all your grain or half of it, shall you have such a writ because he had taken more than he ought to take for multure? No, you shall not, but a common writ of trespass; and so you shall have here. Wherefore you take nothing by your writ." 107. A case of 1369 points to the same conclusion. See note 126, izfra. This action was similar to later examples of action on the case against a negligent innkeeper, but it is worthy of note that in 1369 the action was not called "action on the case" or even "trespass on the case."
108. killed your horse," Belknap, for the plaintiff, replied: "A general writ we could not have had, because the horse was not killed by force . . and then the writ was adjudged good." There is a clear distinction between the writ actually brought and a general writ of trespass. Had Waldon lived two hundred years later his remedy against John Marshall would have been called trespass on the case. Here the writ was regarded by the reporter, and apparently by counsel, not as a new writ with a distinctive name, but as a variation of the established general writ of trespass svi et arinis in the form of a "special writ according to the case." A case of the year 1375 presents a view of the "special" action of trespass which enables us to see how it had already separated to some extent from the parent action of trespass but was still considered part of the parent action. "A writ of trespass upon his case" (sur son cas) was brought against a surgeon for maiming the plaintiff by negligent cure of his wounded hand which the defendant had undertaken (eliprist) to heal."' 0 The defendant denied the undertaking, and offered to wage his law as proof."" "Honington [for the plaintiff]. This is an action of trespass and something which falls within the cognizance of the country, in which case wager of law is not allowed, wherefore for default of answer we pray judgment and ask our damages.
"CANDIsH, J. This writ has nothing to say of force and arms or breach of the peace, so wager of law is acceptable here; . . .and so is the opinion of all the court."
That the defendant's offer of wager of law in this case was sustained by the opinion of all the court indicates that this action of trespass stir son cas was distinguished in their minds from the regular action of trespass. The mode of proof for the latter action was and always had been trial by jury, and wager of law would never have been allowed where there was a breach of the peace. Yet it would be incorrect to infer from this case that trespass stir son cas was an action entirely separate from trespass. A close relation betveen them was obviously present in the minds of the counsel and the court. When the defendant offered wager of law, Honington for 110. Y. B. Hil. 48 Edw. III, f. 6, pl. 11 (1375). The first part of the record of the case reads: "And the writ read that when his right hand had been wounded by one T. B., he against whom the writ is brought undertook [cnprist] to cure his hand, but that by the negligence of him I. M. and his cure, his hand was so injured that he was tortiously maimed and to his damage. . . . And the writ was not 'i c armis nor contra pacem. Gascoigne. He did not undertake to cure him of his malady as he has supposed; ready to wage his law."
111. In fact the defendant in this case waived his tender of law because he saw an adjournment to the next term. Wager of law was thus not the mode of proof in this case, and it is not a precedent for later actions of trespass on the case. the plaintiff declared that this was an unqualified action of trespass. That his client had brought a writ of trespass "upon his case" seemed to Honington no reason for thinking that this was anything other than trespass. Although it sustained the tender of wager of law, the court did not say that the type of action was different from trespass. Nor did they reply to Honington's objections that the action was trespass on the case and not trespass: they merely said that where the writ alleged no breach of the peace. wager of law was permissible.' 1 2
Cases from the Year Books of the succeeding century show quite clearly that for many years the action which we know as case was in a transitional stage in which it was known as the special form of the general action of trespass. In the action of trespass quare clausum fregit brought by one Thomas Frome in 1409. there was a statement of the situation in which the two types of trespass would lie. 113 The question was whether the plaintiff's writ of trespass vi et arnzis would lie where the property in the sheep concerned was in another: "HANKlFORD, J.
• . . For if I lend you certain sheep for a certain time and within the time I take them out of your ward. you will not have a general writ of trespass qnare vi et armis, but a writ formed sur le cas, as here."
A similar distinction between the general writ of trespass and the writ "on the case" appears in the case of Hugh G. v. William T. in 1442."' The court, in deciding whether there had been any wrong in William's taking Hugh's child, discussed the following analogy.
"FULTHORPE. J. . . . For in an action of trespass brought against me for a horse wrongfully taken and I say that he himself is seised of the horse (Judgment if the action, etc.) this is a good plea. And so was the rule before Hankford in the King's Bench, and the reason was this: that it would be against reason that he ought to receive 112. Wager of law as a mode of proof in an action of case apparently was never again suggested or accepted. Its appearance in the case of 1375 may indicate that the rules governing the "special" form of the action of trespass were far from fixed. Reeves. to be sure. said that wager of law could be used in actions of trespass on the case. and that for the same reason, i.e.. the lack of vi ct armis in the writ, the plaintiff was entitled to process only by distraint and not by the capias. 113. Y. B. 11 Hen. IV, f. 23, pl. 46 (1409). In this case Frome charged the defendant with (1) breaking his close, (2) leading a servant out of the plaintiff's service, and (3) taking some sheep. It turned out in the course of the trial that the sheep had once belonged to the servant, who had lent them to the plaintiff for a year; but sometime, either after or before the end of the year, he had taken them again and sold them to the defendant.
114 Although the quotations from each case represent nothing more than dicta, they are significant in indicating that, when the justices wished to differentiate the forms of the action of trespass, they still spoke of one as the "general" action and of the other as the "special" action.
Still later in the fifteenth century this mode of distinguishing the two forms of trespass continued. In the action of trespass sur le cas brought by the Bishop of Salisbury to recover assize and assay of bread and ale in the city of Salisbury, Danvers, C. J., talked at some length about the special writ sur le cas.' 15 The distinction was made again in the action sur son cas brought by Thomas Browne against one Hawkins, for defamation and threatened assault. ' Townesende, for the defendant, suggested a hypothetical writ which he said would abate, "for I put matters for t:wo actions in the writ, that is to say, one for action upon the case, the other for a general writ of trespass." In an anonymous case of 1498, an action of trespass on the case for nuisance, this method of differentiation appears." 7 The plaintiff, a Prior, alleged that the defendant had built a lime pit so close to a certain stream running to his houses in Southwerk that the stream had been polluted, causing the Prior's tenants to leave the houses served by that stream. Keble, for the defendant, challenged the writ because the plaintiff should have "a general writ of trespass quare vi et armis and not a writ upon the case."
It is impossible to read these cases without concluding that to the late fourteenth and fifteenth century legal mind there were two types of trespass, general trespass and special trespass. General trespass was synonymous with trespass vi ct arm is; and in its early days the form 115. Y. B. Trin. 38 Hen. VI, f. 9, pl. 20 (1459). The Bishop claimed the franchises by virtue of letters patent of Richard II to the Bishop's predecessor. The question before the court was whether the Bishop's writ was good without a statement that the city of Salisbury was a part of the fee of the Bishop's predecessor at the time of the letters patent. In the course of the argument Danvers, C. J., said: "The writ ought to be, qtod predictus Episco pus Qucrens in tcrris ct fcodis sits predielis, and this ,%hich is alleged in the court will make the writ good; but this is not clne here. This is one of the most important points which should be included in the writ, particularly [namement] when it is a special writ sur le cas which must include all the matter as clearly as the count. 
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THE 3"4LE LAW JOURNAL of the action of trespass which later became trespass on the case was "special" trespass. When the phrase "on the case" was used in connection with "special" trespass, it was a purely descriptive phrase that referred only to the nature of the writ -a writ "on the case" -and not to the action itself.' "On the case" had had a long history before it became connected with the "'special" form of trespass. It occurs in the endorsement to many petitions to Parliament during the period 1300--1350."' In the petitions the endorsement often read: "Let him go to the Chancery and have a writ upon his case." Although the phrase was applied to many types of writ, the meaning was always, "let him have a writ suitable to the facts of his case," whether the writ was a writ of course, a newly formed writ thereafter to become a writ of course, or a writ of grace, drawn for a peculiar situation. 1 2 This general descriptive meaning of the phrase continued after 1350.Y" In petitions to the King by the Commons during the reign of Henry IV the phrase is used to mean a writ suitable to the plaintiff's needs.
122 Also, it is IM1. That the "'special" form of the action of trespass was developed to provide a remedy for certain wrongs outside the scope of ordinary writs of trespass vi ct aris seems a reasonahie cniclusion from the cases. 119. The early printed Rolls of Parliament contain a number of private petitions to Parliament; some were indorsed in this manner. See note 120, infra.
120. Of the petitions so endorsed, the first group is composed of petitions for wrongs that could be redressed by regular writs of course, which the petitioner had failed to sue. or that had not availed him because of the offender's influence. Most of the writs required were trespass vi ct armis; there were a few examples of conspiracy. See, c.y., 1 ROTULI PARLIAMENTORUM (1767) 316b, 375a, 321a, 382b, 409a. The petitions in the second group represented situations later remediable by a writ of course which apparently had not developed at the time of the petition. In one case, Frowyk v. Lcukeotor,', the petition was responsible for the establishment of the later writ of course. See 1 RTC1.l P.ARIAM.xToRU1. (1767) 278a, 155a; 2 id. at 28a, 39b, 218b. On the use of the in consimili case clause in Frowyk z,. Leukenore to support the newly formed writ of ravishment of ward in socage tenure, see note 50, supra. The third class of petitions were statements of unusual situations in which extraordinary remedies were required; they were the petitions for writs of grace. See 1 RoTuui PARLIAMENTORUM (1767) 416b, 331b, 439a; 2 id. at 93a, 388a.
121. Of all the petitions endorsed with the phrase "on the case" in the printed ROTULI PARLIAAMENTORUM, only two were after 1330; the larger number occurred between 1310 and 1330.
122. These petitions asked for statutory provisions. One, in 1401, was a petition for the enforcement of the statutes regulating the jurisdiction of the Admiralty . the Shaftesbury case is cited to prove that action on the case was known by that name before the end of the fourteenth century. Put it seems clear from the Year Book report itself that this interpretation of the case, as an action on the case for waste, instead of an action of waste, is in error.
124. This was an anonymous suit on a writ of deceit "on the case,' against a defendant who had sold a butt of bad wine as good wine to the plaintiff. Y. B. Mich. 9 Hen. VI, f. 53, pl. 37 (1430). The relationship between the action of trespass on the case and the action of deceit is a complex matter. Deceit, of courfe, was an old common law action, dating at least from the early thirteenth century [see SE.Ecr CIvIL PLEAS (Selden Society 1890) pl. 111], but it was an action which at that time lay only for deception of the court. In the early fifteenth century, however, the action seems to have included deception, whether in litigation or in a sale. In the latter field it encountered the new form of trespass, trespass on the case, which could be brought for damage suffered in a fraudulent sale. Apparently for a time the two actions lay for the same wrong; the REGISTRUM BREVIt'M (1687) has writs of trespass on the case similar to the writ of deceit (upon which the 1430 case was apparently based) given thus originally descriptive of the writ of trespass changed to suit the complainant's case.
Nor did the use of phrases interchangeable with "on the case" cease at once. In the case of Rikhill v. Two Parsons of Bronlaye, for disturbance of an easement, the report describes the action as one of trespass "containing such matter." 13 ' Later Skrene said, "This writ is not contra pacent., but is a writ upon our case [stir nostre case]," and Markham, J., spoke of a "good writ of trespass upon your matter," while Hill said, " . . . it seems reasonable that he should recover by such a writ founded upon his case [foundue stir son case]," 1 2 Thus in 1400, in a writ of trespass, the phrase "upon his case" was analogous to "containing such matter," "founded upon his case," and "trespass upon your matter." These phrases were descriptions of the matter contained in the writ and were not in the least words of art. 133. Y. B. Mich. 2 Hen. IV, f. 3, p1. 9 (1400). This is the earliest known e.ample of "special" trespass brought for the non-performance of a parole promise. The writ was not sustained.
134. Y. B. HiL. 3 Hen. VI, f. 36, pl. 33 (1425). The plaintiff brought an action of trespass against Watkins for failure to perform a parole agreement to make a mill for the plaintiff by Christmas in a given year. The writ was not sustained. "BNDNGroN, J. If one makes an agreement [covenant] with me to cover my roim or a certain house within a certain time, and within the time he does not cover it, so that for default of covering the floor of the h,.iuse all is damaged by the rain, in this case I say that I would have a good writ of trespass sur le inattcre shown against him who made the agreement with me." In the next century, the sixteenth, trespass on the case lay for nonfeasance of a parole promise; but as early as 1425 une juttice was in lavur uf the remedy.
135. Other cases from the fifteenth century show how the name of the action on the case was connected with the form of the writ. In an action of trespass sir le cas in 1429 the plaintiff complained that the defendant had arrested hin on two different occasions when he was going to London about judicial business. The plaintiff's count vas fuller than the writ; the latter was challenged by the defendant: "Fulthorpc. The writ is general and the count is special str Ie cas, in which case the writ ought to be special.
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But during the fifteenth century "on the case" became definitely attached to the "special" writ of trespass. until finally in the late fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries its association with the "special" form of trespass became so strong that its earlier meaning was forgotten. "Action onl the case" no longer meant the writ which suited the plaintiff's case, whatever kind of writ that was. but came to be the name of the action which gave a remedy for damages from an indirect injury of some sort. 136
Although a fixed name for the action of "special" trespass was slow in developing and the action itself was slow in breaking quite away from the parent action, early in its history the form of the writ became different from that for general trespass. Long before the action of special trespass became universally known as action on the case the form of the writ of special trespass had been distinguished from the form of the writ of general trespass; it omitted the vi et armis and contra parent phrases of the general writ. and for the conventional description of the offense in the general writ-quare clausiiun fregit, de bonis asportatis, or some other-it substituted a more or less careful narration of the iacts of the particular case."' Though the form of the writ of special trespass was differentiated early in its career from that of general trespass, the form of the writ was not fixed from its first appearance. The writ given in the first Year Book report of an action of trespass sur 1c cas, the miller's case of 1368, 
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(Vol. 46: 1142 differed, for instance, from later writs of trespass on the case in that it contained the phrase vi et armis.' 3 5 Cases in the succeeding years indicate that there was no general knowledge of the proper form of a special writ of trespass. In TV'aldoi v. llfarshall, the court ruled that contra pacein and ila ncyliqenlctr were mutually exclusive in a writ of trespass, so that if indeed the writ of trespass "according to the case" contained ita nqcligcntcr, it must omit the conventional contra pacem.' Likewise in the action of tre-pa-s against a farrier in 1373 the court ruled that the writ of trespass en son cas need not contain the traditional trespass phrase T'i el armis.' By 1375. then. it was fairly well settled by court decision-that the u rit of special trespass should not include the trespass phrase,: in the casze against the surgeon of that year. a "writ of trespass upon his case." the reporter thought it well to note in the Year Pnook report that' "the %%rit was not vi et ari.s nor contra paceton".
From the later fourteenth century oin. therefore. the writ of special trespass. or trespass on the case, was well e-tablished as a variant form of the general writ of trespass. The one form of the actili was even contrasted with the other by the difference in the writs. Thus in an anonymous case oi 1390 the plaintiff brought an action 'if trcspa¢ against a defendant who had borrowed his horse to ride to a certain place, but had ridden it further on to another and thereby mi enfcchled the horse that the defendant had had to kill it.' -Ga-cuigne. for the defendant, demanded "judgment of the writ which says 'with force and arms. ' He has brought a writ of trespass against us which does not contain the v.i et armis; judgment of the writ. FicHDEN. C. J. He has brought his writ in his case, so his writ is good. Pcrsay. Also he has not supposed in his count that he bailed us the horse to shoe. so it should be understood that ii any trespass was done, it was done against the peace; wherefore judgment. And then the writ was adjudged good." 141. Y. B. Hil. 48 Edw. III, f. 6, pl. 11 (1375): cf. Y. B. Trin. 45 Edw. III. f. 17, pl. 6 (1371). An action of trespass "comprising such matter" was brought by a Prior for failure to perform customary services; "the writ was contra pacein and for such was challenged and abated for this cause, etc:' Later trespass on the case w'as brought for this case; it is possible that the later form of the writ was determined by the errors in the Prior's case, for the marginal note to the writ in the Register says: "Non dicatur in isto brevi nec constinili contra taccm nostrain, ptr ceo que liel brcve fuit abbatt tcrmino Trin. an. 45 E. 3 pur tiel catuse." It may be that the writ of case was evolved by just such a process of trial and error as we see in the Prior's case. RE-1, Tt 
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Skrene for the plaintiffs said: "This writ is not contra pacem, but is a writ upon our case.""14'
The form of the writ of trespass on the case was therefore defined as a writ of trespass that lacked the vi et arm is and contra pacem phrases, and included a recital of the special matter.
4 4 Yet the cases also show that the form of the writ at one time was not determined by a chancery conference, for in that case the writ would always have been the same. The cases prove that the form was evolved over a period of years, beginning p)erhaps' with the vi ct armis form in the miller's case, and was more or less perfected by the time of the surgeon's case of 1375 in which the reporter took such care to note that the writ contained neither vi et arinlis nor conlra patent. Had the writ been framed in accordance with tile in consintili casut clause, its form would have been settled once and for all time by a chancery conference, just as the writ of entry in consiili casit was established in 1310. The writ of special trespass, however. was a writ of evolutionary growth, a writ in which the writ of general trespass was varied to provide the remedy needed.
The evolution of this special form of the writ of trespass is seen in the )ear Book reports of these early cases. There was need at the coinloi law for a remedy for damage suffered for a wrong committed without force. To meet that need, the court permitted the use of a special form of the writ of trespass, a form which omitted the vi et armis and the conlra pacein because they were not in accord with the facts of the case. This variation of the general writ of trespass was known first as special trespass or as trespass "upon my matter," but finally became a separate form of action known as trespass on the case.
The transition was gradual. Beginning as an extraordinary remedy, the special action of trespass continued to be regarded as extraordinary, and was used rather infrequently for a century or so after its first appearance in any form in the Year Books. 1174 [Vol. 46: 1142 
